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How Texans Opposed Civil Rights Legislation in the 1960s:
Evidence from Letters to Future House Speaker Jim Wright
Bv NEIL

ALLEN

This article examines the role of Civil Rights in the career of future House
Speaker JimWright, and the views of Texans about nondiscrimination legislation. Drawing on letters sent to Wright (D-TX) commenting on the legislation that became the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1968 (Open Housing) Civil
Rights Act, this article examines how Texas citizens reacted to, and mostly
opposed, nondiscrimination legislation. This analysis finds that economic
and property rights arguments are the most common type of argument, and
explicitly racist arguments are relatively rare. This article also places the opposition of JimWright's constituents to Civil Rights legislation in the larger
context of his mixed record on the issue while a back-bench representative,
and how this record supported his later rise to leadership of Democrats in
the House of Representatives.

JimWright is best known as Speaker of

the House from 1987-1989,
and for his rapid fall from power due to an ethics scandal in 1989. But
before he was a leader in the House, he represented the Fort Worthbased Texas 12th district during debates over Civil Rights legislation
in the 1950s and 1960s. Wright compiled a mixed voting record on
Civil Rights, voting against the 1964 Act but voting for the 1957 and
1968 Civil Rights Acts and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Wright successfully navigated through this tumultuous period while representing
a district supportive of segregation, positioning himself to move into
the House leadership in the 1970s. Using archival records, this paper
establishes the strength of opposition to civil rights legislation in the
Texas 12th district, and illuminates the sources of that opposition. It
finds that Wright's constituents were overwhelmingly opposed to Civil
Rights Legislation, and that the opposition was heavily oriented toward
support for property rights.
While civil rights bills were seriously debated in Congress since at
least the 1940s, and civil rights legislation has been debated and passed
68
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in the 1970s and 1990s, the period from 1963-68 contained the most
serious and sustained action in the area since at least Reconstruction.
Congress passed the momentous Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the less important 1968 Civil Rights Act
focused on fair housing. Versions of the 1968 legislation were hotly debated in 1966 and 1967 as well. Votes on these bills evidenced
cross-party coalitions in support and opposition, and also the shrinking
of the pro-civil rights coalition over time. This period provides an
opportunity to examine how future leaders like Jim Wright navigated
this complex issue environment. Wright's election as House Majority
Leader in 1976 was particularly notable, considering that he was elected
by a caucus that had become strongly committed to the pro-integration
position that Wright himself came to relatively late.
The 88th-90th Congresses (1963-1969) included seven members
that would later enter or advance in congressional leadership: Wright
of Fort Worth, Carl Albert of Oklahoma, Hale Boggs of Louisiana,
Gerald Ford of Michigan, John Rhodes of Arizona, Robert Dole of
Kansas, and Robert Michel of Illinois. This article focuses on Wright,
whose election as House Majority Leader in 1976 was the last in a continuous string of victories by candidates in contested leadership elections that were more closely identified with the Southern conservative
wing of the party than their opponents, referred to in a recent work as
"The Austin-Boston Connection.

This article first discusses the career of Jim Wright in Texas and national politics, with a focus on his complex relationship to Civil Rights .
I then discuss the arguments made by citizens who wrote to Wright
about Civil Rights in the 1960s, drawing on archival records from his
papers housed at Texas Christian University. I then conclude with a
discussion of the role of Civil Rights and property rights in the shift
of Texas from a Democratic to Republican state.

JimWrightas Future Congressional Leader and "SouthernLiberal"
Jim Wright was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in
1954, and served until his resignation in 1989. He had previously
served as the elected Mayor of the small city of Weatherford west of
Fort Worth, and served one term in the Texas State House from 1947
to 1949. He was "known as the foremost liberal" in the Texas House
69
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delegation in the 1950s in particular due to his willingness to oppose
the interests of petroleum producers. He was ambitious and upwardly
mobile throughout his career, first focusing on winning a Senate seat.
When Lyndon Johnson became Vice President in 1961, Wright ran for
the open Senate seat and finished third, less than two percentage points
behind the appointed Democrat Sen. William Blakely. Wright would
have likely beaten Republican John Tower in the runoff, as Blakely lost
Texas liberal support due to his conservatism. Wright attempted to
gain the nomination to run against Tower in 1966, but ended his campaign after his fundraising fell below expectations.
The Civil Rights politics of Texas in the 1950s and 1960s were a
complex mix of continued Jim Crow segregation along with gradual progress toward integration. Conservative Governor Alan Shivers
fought against post-Brown v. Board of Education school desegregation
with the rhetoric of interposition, echoing the "massive resistance"
politics of his counterparts in Virginia and the Deep South, using the
Texas Rangers to prevent court-ordered integration in Mansfield and
Texarkana. A liberal like Ralph Yarborough, however, could win election in 1957 at the height of the post-Brown backlash, and fight off
a segregationist challenge from future President George H.W Bush in
the 1964 general election. Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson, occupying legislative and executive leadership roles in Washington, charted
a middle path .
This complexity of Civil Rights politics was present in the Metroplex region that sent Wright to Washington. Fort Worth had a White Citizens' Council as early as 1955, and the NAACP was active in the city in
the years after Brown v. Board of Education. North Texas State College (now the University of North Texas) in nearby Denton had long
denied admission to black undergraduates, but peacefully complied
with a federal court ruling in 1955, enrolling over 247 black students
by 1958 (Marcello 1996). This pattern of gradual integration stimulated by legal action and peaceful protest activity fits the larger pattern
identified by Brian Behnken in his study of the Dallas civil rights experience. He argues that the "Dallas Way" of business-oriented consensus politics provided opportunity for black protest actions to stimulate
gradual integration: "To maintain the positive image of the city and
promote business growth, Dallas's leaders proved willing to negotiate
with blacks and implement desegregation measures." This movement
toward integration occurred while Dallas County sent Bruce Alger, a
70
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right-wing anti-integration Republican, to Congress until 1964, and in
1960 voters in the Dallas School District voted against school integration by a four-to-one margin.
Operating on the left of Texas politics in the 1950s and 1960s,
Jim Wright was vulnerable to attack as an integrationist, in particular
because of his record as, by Texas standards, a liberal leader of the UT
College Democrats while an undergraduate. The student group called
for anti-lynching legislation, ending the poll tax, and integrating the university's law school. When running for reelection to the Texas House
of Representatives in 1948, Wright's Democratic primary opponent attempted to use the ongoing NAACP litigation involving the University
of Texas Law School against him. Eugene Miller, a former state legislator, said Wright wanted "every uppity nigra with a high school diploma" to attend the University of Texas Law School. Wright responded
by running a newspaper ad saying "I believe in the Southern tradition
of segregation and have strongly resisted any efforts to destroy it."
Wright attempted to stay within the mainstream of Texas Democrats,
opposing particular facets of Jim Crow while protecting against rightwing militant attack.
Wright continued his rhetorical support for segregation during his
early service in the U.S. House. When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
public school segregation unconstitutional in Brownv.BoardofEducation
in 1954 and ruled that schools must be integrated "with all deliberate
speed" the following year, Wright followed the lead of more senior
Southern leaders in supporting the rejected "separate but equal" standard that had been precedent since Ples.ryv. Fergusonin 1896. Then in
his first term, Wright said the Supreme Court "erred in judgment ...
I feel that segregation could be ideally maintained without discrimination, that is possible for facilities to be equal while being separate." This
rhetorical support for segregation, while maintaining his legislative focus on bringing federal resources to Fort Worth and Texas with his seat
on the Public Works Committee, followed the example set by Speaker
Sam Rayburn (D-Bonham) and Rayburn's former protege then-Senate
Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. Rayburn and Johnson maintained
rhetorical support for segregation, strengthening their ties to Southern
conservatives while also retaining support of the progressive liberal
minority within their respective Democratic caucuses.
The white backlash that swept the South, particularly the Deep
South, in the years following Brown eroded this mildly segregationist
71
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middle ground that Wright and other Texas liberal and economically-populist congressmen were attempting to occupy. The congressional manifestation of the regional backlash was the "Southern Manifesto," a militant segregationist statement of principles produced by
Deep South Senators. The Manifesto's creators, led by Senator Richard
Russell of Georgia, did not ask Rayburn or Johnson to sign, saving
them from a choice that would have inflamed a large portion of the
caucus they were attempting to lead. Russell and other senior Southern
Senators also were attempting to support a future presidential run by
Johnson, which would only be possible if he could be acceptable to
non-Southern liberals in the party.
Lowly back-benchers like Jim Wright, however, had to make
a public choice to sign or refuse to sign. Following the pattern see
in other Peripheral South state like Florida, North Carolina and
Tennessee, the Texas House delegation split on the issue. Right-wing
members from rural areas of the state, like Martin Dies and John
Dowdy of East Texas and O.C. Fisher of West Texas, signed the
Manifesto and continued to incorporate anti-integrationist arguments
into their broader anti-communist conservatism. Wright Patman of
Northeast Texas, whose populist criticism of large financial institutions
as Chair of the Banking Committee made him a hero to younger Texas
liberals like Wright, signed the Manifesto. Facing a right -wing primar y
challenge, representing the part of the state most similar to the Deep
South, Patman acted to protect his position of power over other areas
of public policy.
Wright, however, joined the majority of the Texas House delegation
in rejecting the strident position of the Southern Manifest o. Histori an Tony Badger, attempting to explain why border -state Senators and
House members rejected the Manifesto, attributes the Texas pattern to
the influence of Rayburn. The Speaker saw the document as a potential wedge within his fractious caucus. The state's position in the 1950s
House was as strong as any in histor y, with the Speakership and several
committee chairmanships. This was only possible if the Democratic
Party could stay relatively united and in the majority. Also Rayburn and
Johnson were engaged back home in a struggle for control of the state
party, against the conservative faction led by Governor Alan Shivers
that wanted to withdraw support from the national Democratic Party's
presidential ticket in 1956. This ultimately successful effort of Rayburn and Johnson depended on isolating the more militant anti -federal
government conservatives within the party.
72
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In justifying his more integrationist stance, Wright drew on his
Christian (Presbyterian) faith, stating that "hatred is evil in the sigh of
God. The Negro is a child of God, as am I and as are my kinsman.
He possesses an immortal soul, as do we." Wright would continue this
support for limited integration by voting for the 1957 Civil Rights Act,
which was limited to the right to vote and had little practical effect on
Southern society.
Like many more moderate Southerners in Congress, Wright offered
mixed and conflicted positions on the more consequential Civil Rights
legislation of the 1960s. He voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
citing support for property rights. He supported the more popular
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the quite controversial Civil Rights Act
of 1968, with its mostly ineffectual focus on open housing. This eventual move to a more integrationist position would serve him well in
the most important election of his career, his narrow victory as House
Majority Leader in 1976.

Constituent Letter Data
Like every member of Congress, Jim Wright received letters from
constituents and other citizens commenting on issues of the day.
Fortunately for students of Civil Rights, Congress and Texas History,
Wright and his staff preserved incoming correspondence on Civil Rights
legislation from 1963-1966, totally 893 individual letters. This archive
opens a window on the opinions of everyday Texans in this period
of contestation and transformation of racial norms and rules. It also
illuminates the expectations that constituents had of representatives like
Jim Wright, and the cross-pressures elected officials experience.
Citizens who write letters to their congressman are a clearly self-selected group. The decision to write to a person who they likely know
only from popular media and sometimes a newsletter marks them as
more interested in public affairs than their fellow citizens, and likely
holding more definite and considered opinions. Archival data like that
under review here is best understood as a measure of "motivated public
opinion," providing a more narrow but deeper look into the attitudes
of citizens on legislative issues than possible in public opinion polling.
Letters provide a measure of district opinion, both in terms of basic support and opposition and the substantive content of actual and
potential voters. While the letters sent to congressional offices are not
a representative sample of district or voter opinion, they do com.mu73
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nicate to legislators and their staff the views of those they represent.
Particularly in the 1960s, when polling was infrequent at the national level and virtually nonexistent at the district level, letters provided
members a proxy for district opinion. Taeku Lee, in Mobilizing Public
Opinion (2002), argues that letters to the president have significant advantages as a measure of public opinion over opinion polls, in that they
do not contain "non-attitudes" and contain argumentative content .
This article examines letters to Congressman Jim Wright, sent to his
Washington office and preserved in the James Wright Papers at Texas
Christian University in Fort Worth. The collection contains files with
letters from 1963 and 1964 addressing the legislation that became the
1964 bill. The archive also preserves letters from 1966 addressing that
year's proposal, mainly concerning the inclusion on Title IV, an open
housing provision that would have applied to sales of owner-occupied
homes and rental of units in structures with at least four units. No letters have been preserved from 1967 and 1968 concerning the modified
and weakened open housing bill that became the 1968 Civil Rights Act.
There is no definite way of knowing that a given folder contains
all letters sent to a congressman like Wright on a given issue during a
particular time. All files analyzed here contain both support and opposition to legislation, which supports the assumption that there is not
a corresponding "For" or "Against" file that was discarded. It is likely
that staff discarded some portion of out -of-district and out-of-state
letters, particularly since the practice of congressional offices was often
to only reply to in-district letters. The data analyzed below, although
limited by multiple kinds of selection bias, support generalizatidns
about support for civil rights legislation, and the content of arguments
made by constituents.
All letters were coded for Support or Opposition to Civil Rights legislation. I only included letters where support or opposition to Congressional action is clear from the text. I did not include letters that expressed an opinion but did not express support or opposition, although
these were few in number. I did not include letters asking for a copy of
legislation, unless the request was part of a larger argument for or against
legislation. I counted a letter as commenting on legislation if the writer
mentioned a bill number, a proper or informal name for a specific bill,
or referencing action by Congress. Letters that specifically called for action on school desegregation or limitation of the power of the Supreme
Court were not included, although tl1ese were also few in number.
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Argumentative Content: Letters to Jim Wright
Letters from constituents not only provide data on support or opposition to particular legislation, they reveal the type of arguments that
underlie support or opposition. A letter that argues the 1964 Civil
Rights Act should be opposed by their congressman because it is unconstitutional shows a different foundation for opposition than one
who claims their opposition comes from a belief that non-whites are
inferior. The kinds of arguments made for and against legislation reveal the reasons for those positions, and also the kind of arguments
writers think will be persuasive.
All letters analyzed in this article were coded for their general stance
toward Civil Rights Legislation, and five argumentative types: Property
Rights, Constitutional, Communist/Socialist, Totalitarian, and White
Supremacist/Racist. Many letters used more than one type, and the
majority of letters used none. Some letters merely called for support
or opposition to legislation, and others had argumentative content that
did not fit into my typology. I define and discuss each type below with
evidence from the Wright collection.
(See Table 1)
Nearly nine out of ten letters in the Civil Rights files of Jim Wright,
housed at Texas Christian University, express opposition to civil rights
legislation. Many letters merely urge Wright to vote against legislation,
as he did in 1964, but not in 1965 and 1968. Others use creative metaphors to illustrate their opposition. A married couple from Fort Worth
wrote on June 4, 1966 that the proposed open housing legislation was
"garbage":
My husbandand I are smallproper!}owners,and we think the bill is so
rottenit stinks. When wefind at!)thingaroundourhousethat stinks we
throwit into thegarbage. We expectyou to do the samewith that bill
Some writers, like this constituent from Fort Worth in 1966, presented fantastical slippery-slope arguments about the push for civil
rights legislation:

lf

Bills of this nahtrearepassed,howfar are wefrom the legislationthat
wouldmake it afederalcrimefor a personto r(!jectal'!}marriageproposal
on theground the refusalinvolvesthe otherparry} civil rights? Not too
75
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longback,I wouldhaveregarded
this questionas ludicrous;nowit appears
to be no smallthing.
Many writers in opposition to legislation presented variations on
the theme of a loss of core American values, often linked with arguments that civil rights legislation was merely a Trojan Horse for some
other nefarious goal. A frequent refrain was that bills were "10% civil
rights, and 90% federal power."
These defenses of the established order in American politics used
several distinct, but often complimentary, types of argument. After
reading a subsample of letters, I selected four types that seemed common or likely in letters: Property Rights, Constitutional, Communism/
Socialism, and White Supremacist/Racist. After coding around half of
the Wright letters, I added an additional type for Totalitarian.
The most common type of argument, present in 37% of letters,
was Property Rights. A letter received this code if the writer argued
explicitly that legislation was eliminating property rights, or the rights
of property owners. I also included letters that argued that legislation took away the right of owners to make decisions involving their
property. Some letters in this category also made reference to specific
examples, like defending the ability of an owner of a house to rent a
room to a person of their choosing.
An illustrative example, from a Fort Worth resident on June 9,
1963, makes reference to Wright's relative liberalism and connects it to
property rights and other values:

I disagreemost emphatical/y
withyour work in the U.S. House of Representatives
faryou havecontinual/yspokenfar the trendtowardSocialism
in this country.I am againsttheAdministration}proposedCivil Rights
Bill. It is an unconstitutional
attemptto depriveAmerican (sic)of their
proper!}nghts.. . . You havemademe a Republican.
This letter, like many others, joins a property rights argument to
other argumentative types discussed below. This letter is typical of
those supporting Property Rights, in that those rights are presented as
universal, not specifically as enjoyed by white Americans. A letter from
the National Restaurant Association on Nov. 1, 1963, presented a more
concrete argument against the public accommodations section of the
bill that became the 1964 Civil Rights Act:
76
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By suf?jecting
private businessto unnecessary
harassmentand f?yenabling
the FederalGovernmentto exert morecontroloverindividualrightsand
overprivatebusiness,theproposals,if enacted,canon/yresultin the diminutionoffree enterpriseand of the rightsandfreedomsof all citizens.
Property Rights is presented here as a universal concept at the core
of American politics and society. Some writers also presented a pragmatic case for property rights, focusing on the experience of the property owner under proposed legislation:

A propertyowner,actingin goodfaith, might be accusedof de1!Jing
the
rightof a memberof a minoritygroup or a'!)'bocfy
else,for that matter,
to b1!Jhisproperty. The accuserhas the right to sue the ownerof such
property. Whetherthe accuseris actingin goodfaith or out ofsheermalice
the end resultwill be the same. Thepropertyownermqyface monthsor
years of costfylitigationtryingto establishhis innocence.He will not be
ableto disposeof his ownpropertywhilesettlementof the caseispending.
jobs oftendemandfrequent
To ma'!)'in ourmobileAmericansocietywhere
transfers,this couldmeandisaster.
Wright, who would later vote for the 1968 Civil Rights Act that
included restrictions on the choices of residential property owners,
echoed this opposition to legislation on Property Rights grounds in
his ''Wright Slant" newsletter to constituents on June 23, 1963. This
support for a Property Rights critique of then-president Kennedy's
civil rights proposals garnered support from letter writers, with one
correspondent from Houston writing on June 28, 1963 that Wright's
statement was the "highest expression of Americanism." Responding
to a constituent letter also in June of 1963, Wright drew a clear distinction between public institutions that are legitimately subject to federal
government regulation, and private institutions that are exempt:

Thereis in my mind a clearlegaldifferencebetweenpublic/yowned,tax
financedfacilities on the one hand, and private businessestablishments,
privatefyownedand individual/ysupportedon a voluntarybasisf?yindividualcustomerson the other.
I believe in the government's duty to protect the constitutional
rights of every citizen. But one of these rights is the right of private
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property. I do not want to see the government violate this right, any
more than I would want it to violate any other constitutional right of
our citizens.
This focus on private property that Wright shared with his constituents helps to explain how Wright supported bills focusing on voting
rights in 1957 and 1965, but opposed the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Wright continued this Private Property focus in the first phases of
the open housing debates on the 89th and 90th Congresses. Responding to a Ft. Worth letter of June 26, 1966, opposing how "our government has systematically eroding the rights of one group of citizens to
improve those of other citizens," Wright wrote on July 1, 1966:

Thankyo11for yo11rcomm11nication.
I thinkyo11are correctinyo11roppositionto Title IV ef theproposedCivil Rights Bill ef 1966. In my
;itdgment,thisprovisionsho11ld
notand willnot beenacted.I have,infact,
so advisedthe President.
CertainfyI co11ld
not voteto remove
from theAmericanpeoplea tight ef
choiceso basicand sopersonalas the selectionef thoseto whomwe might
wishto sellor rent 011rhomes.
This does not mean that I favor discrimination against any race.
You and I probably feel about the same way. It will be recalled that I
actively supported the Voting Rights bill last year, assuring to all Americans these equal and fundamental rights of citizenship. But just as I
opposed certain provisions of the Civil Rights Bill of 1964 as an unwarranted invasion of the rights of private property, so I do oppose
this new proposal.
Wright also voted with 20 of 22 Texas congressmen to remove
Title IV (a strong open housing provision) from the 1966 Civil Rights
Act. While Wright's papers do not include letters from 1967-68, it is
unlikely that they would reflect any change in their opposition grounded in Property Rights. Letters to Earl Cabell, representing a similar
next-door district, reflected the same trend of opposition from 1966
through 1968.
Constitutional argument was the second most common type, at
17% of letters. I counted letters in this group if the writer argued
particular legislation was unconstitutional, or that constitutional rights
were at stake in this issue. While writers occasionally mentioned specif78
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ic constitutional provisions like the Republican Form of Government
clause or Free Speech, Constitutional arguments usually were of the
general variety shown here by a Houston resident on Oct. 14, 1963:

The Civil Rights Bill qf 1963 is afurther extensionoffederalexecutive
ofall races.It is nothingb11t
powercreatedat the expenseof individ11als
a lawfor a controlled!)'Stemof life whichis in directoppositionto 011r
Constit11tion.
. . . Stand 1tpfor Constit11tional
governmentwhichg11aranteeS !atesand h11mantights as Godgrantedus thesesrightsi?Jdoing
everything
inyo11rpowerto defeattheso calledCivil RightsBill of 1963.
Related to both Property Rights and Constitutional arguments is
the next most common type, Communism/Socialism at 8%. I classified letters as in this group if they criticized legislation as Communist
or Socialist (which were used interchangeably and negatively in context). Writers would have to explicitly mention either ideology, like a
Fort Worth resident on June 20, 1966:

High amongthe of?jectives
of Comm11nism
is the abolitionof the concept
ofprivateproper(Y. To deprivea personi?Jlaw of the rightto absol11te
ownershipofproper(}and the abili(Yto choosewithincertainbo11nds
what
he mqy do with it, is to make a mockeryof the rightto life, liber(Yand
thep11rs11it
of happinessas ascribedi?J011rforefatherswhofo11ndedthis
Nation of 011rs.
Interference with private property or economic choice of any type
is often classified as communist or socialist, usually with no reference
to the rights of minorities that might have countervailing claims.
The following lengthy quote from a Smithfield, Texas resident on
July 2, 1963 shows how anti-communism, support for private property
and a constitutional theory based on economic rights were reinforcing
concepts. This letter to Jim Wright also explicitly casts these concepts
as unconnected to racial rights, but founded on universalistic concepts:

We are not againstcolored
peoplehavingmorefreedom;however,weAbhorand Detesta'!)!rnlingthat destrqys
free enterprise.We are Jpeaking
of theproposalthat a'!Ycajeowneror ownersof vario11s
otherb11siness
establishments
m11stcaterto negroeswhetherthry wishit or not.
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This is merely another step our government is taking toward becoming a Socialistic State. Businesses should always have, as in the
past, the right to refuse service to anyone. When the government of
the United States has the power to tell an individual how he must run
his business and to whom he must cater, we no longer have a government by the people and for the people. Instead, we have something
very similar to what we fought against in World War 2.
This letter also shows another argumentative type, Totalitarianism.
Letters are classified as using a Totalitarian type of argument if
the writer claimed that civil rights legislation (usually the 1964 variant)
constituted a government on the same form as the Nazi Germany or
Soviet Russia. The following passage from June 17, 1963 shows this
classification of civil rights legislation as creating a totalitarian government.

We, as citizensef the UnitedStates, andyou, in particular,shouldbe
quiteconcerned
with thepowersthat the Presidentis tryingto assume. We
speak ef&mia havinga dictatorand efGerma'!Yhavinghad its Hitler,
111hen
we sit and watcha man that cancertain!Jbe classifiedas moreef a
dictatorialindividualthan eitherthe caseefRussia or Germaf!Y.
This letter also claims that President Kennedy is attempting to become a dictator, a claim also sometimes applied to his brother Robert
as Attorney General. Merely making this argument about increasing
presidential power was not classified as Totalitarian.
An interesting finding of this study is the relative absence of explicitly racist or white-supremacist arguments. Only 3% of letters used
a White Supremacist or Racist argument. I defined this category as
including writers that argued non-whites were inferior to whites, that
ascribed negative characteristics to non-whites, or that explicitly supported segregation. Some writers like a Fort Worth resident writing on
June 6, 1966, made explicitly race-conscious arguments in conjunction
with other argument types:

I do not wantto livein the sameroomswithNegroes,Mexicansor whatever elsewishesto movein withme. I havea bedroomand needsomeonefor
companionship
but I suredon'twant a Negroor a Mexican. This makes
us as bad as the Communistor Gestapo.
80
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Such arguments, however, only appear in 26 of 893 letters from Jim
Wright's Texas constituents.
This relative lack of explicitly racial or racist appeals should not
be seen as evidence of the absence of racism or white supremacy by
letter writers. It however does reveal the assumptions of citizens about
which arguments will likely be persuasive of their representatives, and
also how underlying racist attitudes were held in conjunction with
race-neutral arguments. Letter-writers were over twelve times more
likely to ground their argument in economics than to reference racial
characteristics.

Conclusion: The Shifting Politics of Race and Property Rights
Review of letters sent by Texans to future House Speaker Jim
Wright yield two significant conclusions about race in American and
Texas politics. First, a skilled, or possibly lucky, politician like Jim
Wright could still navigate the politics of race and federal public policy
from a Texas foundation, and ascend to the national leadership of the
leftward-shifting Democratic Party. Second, Wright's incoming correspondence on race in the 1960s reveals the primacy of private property
rights in Texas and American political culture.
Jim Wright, like most Democratic Texas congressmen of the time,
was able to avoid serious electoral challenge. The closest he ever came
to defeat was in 1980, when he defeated a well-funded Republican challenge from Fort Worth Mayor Pro Tern Jim Bradshaw 60%-40 % while
Ronald Reagan was carrying the district 52%-46% over Jimmy Carter
What is more significant is his rise to leadership in 1976, during period
when liberals and reformers were advancing within the Democratic
Party. When he ran for the open Majority Leader position in 1976,
he was a throwback to a different Democratic Party. As a high-rank ing member of the pork-barreling Public Works Committee, he was
a defender of advancement by seniority, which had been drastically
weakened by reforms after the 1974 election. Wright had a mixed record on Civil Rights, and sought leadership of a party where Southern
segregationists were a rapidly -shrinking minority.
Wright's voting record in the 1950s and 1960s was only partly what
his constituents, or at least those constituents motivated to write letters,
wanted from their man in Washington. His support in 1968 of a federally-enforced, though weak, right to buy or rent housing irrespective
of race cut against the nearly 9 in 10 of respond ents who opposed
81
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federal intervention on behalf of racial minorities. But that vote on
the 1968 Civil Rights Act moved him closer to his non-Southern colleagues. The growing backlash against federal social and economic
action was rapidly eroding the Great Society coalition, with support
for Civil Rights legislation on final passage dropping from 69% in 1964
to 59% in 1968 on final passage. Wright, along with future Majority
Leader Hale Boggs of Louisiana, were two of only five of 294 members who voted on both bills, but shifted from opposition to support.
This was a case of "pre-leaderships signaling," showing liberal members of the caucus that Wright and Boggs were joining the pro-civil
rights mainstream of the party.
Wright understood his vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and his roots in the segregationist one-party Texas of the 1950s and
1960s, were a liability in his 1976 race. Combined with his support for
the Vietnam War and relative conservatism on domestic issues, Wright's
voting record placed him behind two other ambitious Democrats as
the party met to select new leadership. The other two major candidates
had unimpeachable Civil Rights credentials. The frontrunner was Phil
Burton (D-CA), from San Francisco, had voted for all Civil Rights bills
from 1964 forward and was a leader of the reformist group of Democrats that had swelled with the 1974 Watergate landslide. Richard
Bolling (D-MO) of Kansas City had an even longer record of pro-Civil
Rights activity as the primary supporter of integration legislation on
the powerful Rules Committee. Wright's notes for his speech to the
closed-door Democratic Caucus meeting prior to the Majority Leader
election outline his argument on Civil Rights. He emphasizes his votes
for the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and every piece of integration legislation
from the 1965 Voting Rights Act forward. He explicitly references his
evolution on the issue as a Southern liberal.
Wright specifically addressed his prior mixed record on civil rights
in a letter to Democratic Houses colleagues Nov. 17, 1976, just prior to
the Majority Leader vote. He writes that "I could not pretend to have
a 'perfect' record on civil rights," claiming he voted against some bills
"for reasons which I thought at the time to be valid but which I no lon ger believe to be correct." Wright cites his refusal to sign the Southern
Manifesto, vote for the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and support for all post1964 integration legislation, stating:
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I ampleasedi?Jthefact that I haveprobab/yhaveasgoodand long-standing a recordof supportfar basicciviland human rightsas mryonefrom
mypart of the countrycouldbe expectedto haveand survivein thepoliticalturbulentyears that are behindus. My recordin this regardis quite
differentfrom that of most of my colleagues
from thegeographic
areaI
represent.
The Texan attempts to diminish the sterling pro-integration records
of his rivals Bolling and Burton, writing "it takes a hell of a lot more
courage and conviction for a person from my area to take these public
positions than it does for someone from Kansas City or California."
The evidence presented here from Wright's incoming constituent
correspondence clearly support his retrospective evaluation of the political context facing a relatively-liberal Southerner deciding whether to
support or oppose the 1964 Civil Rights Act. While most House members from the region did vote against the landmark legislation, Wright
probably overstated the narrowness of his options. Fellow Texas liberal
House member Jack Brooks, then representing a district that included
Beaumont and much of rural East Texas, voted for all civil rights bills
including the 1964 legislation and was consistently reelected. Charles
Weltner, representing an Atlanta-centered Georgia district, voted for
the 1964 Act and was narrowly reelected. But Wright's larger point
about his electoral vulnerability on the issue was correct.
Wright's Civil Rights evolution was just enough to support his narrow election. Bolling and Burton had both alienated potential supporters with ideological inflexibility and an unwillingness to cultivate personal relationships. Wright's base of Southerners, conservatives and
committee chairman enabled him to eliminate Bolling by two votes
in the penultimate vote, and to best Burton by a single vote for the
Majority Leadership. This narrow victory enabled Wright to succeed
Tip O'Neil as Speaker of the House in 1986, and to function as one of
the most effective modern legislative leaders until his rapid fall in 1989.
Wright was the last leader of the Democratic Party in Congress
to emerge from the coalition of urban machine liberals and Southern
conservatives that dominated the party in the House and often the
Senate in the middle part of the twentieth century. When forced to
resign over allegations of financial improprieties involving publishing
contracts and campaign finance in 1989, Wright was replaced by Tom
Foley of Washington State, a liberal in the reformist tradition. Not
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since Wright have the House Democrats had a leader who was from
the South, or from the moderate portion of the party.
The opposition to Civil Rights legislation, and to federal government action in general, that emerges from Wright's incoming correspondence reveals one source of this leftward shift in the Democratic
Party. The movement of whites to the Republican Party that began on
the presidential level in the 1960s would by the 1990s leave the Democrats as a clear minority in Southern congressional elections. Candidates from states like Texas could no longer count on the support of
the dozens of moderate and Southern populist members necessary to
advance in House leadership. This shift was evident in the ascension
of Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) to the leadership of House Democrats in
2003. A protege of Jim Wright's 1970s antagonist Phil Burton, and
representing Burton's old San Francisco congressional seat, Pelosi is
firmly anchored on the left end of a left-trending party. When Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) left the leadership to run for
president in 2004, Martin Frost (D-TX) began preparing to challenge
Pelosi, then the second-ranking House Democrat. Frost, a former Jim
Wright loyalist who represented much of Wright's old Fort Worth base,
would have created a rerun of the 1976 Majority Leader race with a
challenge to Pelosi from the moderate wing of the party. But after
canvassing potential supporters, Frost decided that his chances were
so slim he would not even attempt to challenge the California liberal
Pelosi.
The opposition to Civil Rights, which Jim Wright sometimes joined
and later repudiated, is often conceptualized as fundamentally about
racism and white supremacy. But the prominence of property-rights
arguments in Wright's incoming Civil Rights correspondence reveals
a different facet of the anti -integration narrative. This data demonstrates the fundamental importance of individual economic rights in
the American political tradition. Support for a free-market society in
which individuals are unencumbered by government regulation was
a powerful component of the defense of segregation . This property-rights narrative, while idealized and ignoring the valid economic rights claims of minorities, allowed supporters of segregation to
connect their economic and personal interest with broader egalitarian
themes in American politics.
Seen from the perspective of the property and economic-rights
grounded opposition to integration of Wright's constituents, the legis-
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lative output of the federal government in the 1960s is even more remarkable. When President Lyndon Johnson of Texas pushed through
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, he was staking his political future and that
of his party on a vision of federal government action that ran counter
to the understanding of American individuals rights held by Texans.
Even in a then-strongly Democratic Fort Worth represented by the relatively-liberal Jim Wright, integrating public accommodations and employment was understood as a denial of fundamental individual rights.
The narrative of economic individualism, while supportive of
white privilege, could be expressed by individual citizens in a facially
non-racist manner. When the brief pro-federal action consensus of
1964-65 evaporated in the conflict of the late 1960s, the Democratic
Texas of Lyndon Johnson and Jim Wright gave way eventually to a
Republican Texas of strong devotion to individual economic liberty
and opposition to federal government action. The direct achievements
of Civil Rights legislation remain, as legal segregation is no more and
minorities participate in the political process. But the argument of Jim
Wright's constituents, that the federal government has no place limiting or influencing the economic choices of individuals and businesses,
continue to drive American and Texas politics.
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Notes
John McCormack unopposed for Speaker in 1961, Albert defeating Richard
Bolling in 1961 for Majority Leader, McCormack's victory over Morris
Udall in 1968, Albert's lopsided victory over John Conyers in 1970 for
Speaker, Boggs defeating Udall and James O'Hara in 1971, Wright over
Bolling and Phil Burton in 1976. Anthony Champagne, Douglas B. Hiirris, James W. Riddlesperger Jr., and Garrison Nelson, The Austin-Boston
Connection: Five Decades of House Democratic Leadership, 1937-1989,
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2008).
1

The NAACP litigation, which Wright was unconnected to, eventually
led to the U.S. Supreme Court decision Sweatt v. Painter in 1950, ruling
that the University of Texas Law School must admit blacks.
2

The Eisenhower administration's stronger bill, which was similar to the
later 1964 Act, could not overcome a Senate filibuster in 1956. The 1957
bill was able to avoid the same fate by subjecting claims of denial of voting
rights to jury trial, insuring continued white control of civil rights policy
in the South.

3

Phone calls to offices also serve as a kind of proxy for public opinion, but
have not been preserved in archives.

4

Works using by George Lovell (on Civil Rights) and Alan Brinkley (on
populist critics of President Franklin Roosevelt) use archival letters to establish mass political attitudes during the New Deal period. See George I.
Lovell, This is Not Civil Rights: Discovering Rights Talk in 1939 America
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Alan Brinkley, Voices of
Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression.
5

Wright also replied to letters from clearly out-of-district locations (for
example Houston or Dallas). This might be related to the fact that he was
preparing for another statewide Senate campaign in 1966.

6

I here assume that a writer in 1964 who, in a general manner, calls for
Congress to support or oppose school integration is not specifically commenting on the portions of the 1964 bill that gave the federal government
the ability to bring suit on behalf of children in segregated public schools.
Infrequently writers would comment directly on that part of the bill, and
those letters were included. Wright likely received letters in the 1950s
and 1960s about school integration judicial rulings like Brown v. Board of

7
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Education, but these were not preserved in his papers.
Jim Wright Papers (JW), Texas Christian University Special Collections,
Civil Rights File.

8

9JW
These letter writers do not address the possibility that guaranteeing civil
rights might require federal action, including enhanced authority.
10

11

JW, Civil Rights File.

12

ibid.

13

Ibid.

14

Ibid.

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid.

17

The attempt to strip Title IV failed 190-222, but the bill died in the Senate.

18 A sample of letters to Cabell 1966-68, drawn from his papers at Southern
Methodist University, were 82% opposed to Civil Rights Legislation.

19

JW, Civil Rights File.

20

Ibid.

21

Ibid .

22

Ibid.

23

JW, Undated notes, Civil Rights File.

Richard Bolling Papers, letter from Jim \Vright to Robert Dawson, University of Missouri-Kansas City Library Special Collections,Jim Wright folder.

24

25

See Champagne et. al, 230-250 .

26

HoustonChronicleNov. 9, 2002.
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Table 1: Argument Type, Jim Wright Letters

Argument Type
For Civil Rights
Against Civil
Rights
Property Rights
Constitutional
Communist/
Socialist
Totalitarian
White Supremacist
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#

%

97
796

11%

89%

334
153
71

8%

53
26

6%
3%

37%
17%

